















































  JOINT CENTER    








The Regulation–Litigation Interaction 
 










             Working Paper 01-13 
         












W. Kip Viscusi is John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics at Harvard University.  
This research was supported in part by the Sheldon Seevak Research Fund and the Olin Center 
for Law, Economics and Business.  Robert Hahn and Robert Litan provided excellent comments 
and support for the conference more generally. Editor’s introduction prepared for AEI-Brookings 
Joint Center conference on Regulation through Litigation.                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
 JOINT CENTER 
             
 
In response to growing concerns about understanding the impact of regulation on 
consumers, business, and government, the American Enterprise Institute and the 
Brookings Institution have established the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies. The primary purpose of the center is to hold lawmakers and regulators more 
accountable by providing thoughtful, objective analysis of existing regulatory programs 
and new regulatory proposals. The Joint Center builds on AEI’s and Brookings’s 
impressive body of work over the past three decades that has evaluated the economic 
impact of regulation and offered constructive suggestions for implementing reforms to 
enhance productivity and consumer welfare. The views in Joint Center publications are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff, council of 
academic advisers, or fellows. 
 
 
         ROBERT W. HAHN                                                    ROBERT E. LITAN     
Director       Codirector 
 
 
COUNCIL OF ACADEMIC ADVISERS 
KENNETH J. ARROW 
Stanford University  
  MAUREEN L. CROPPER 
University of Maryland  
and World Bank 
  PHILIP K. HOWARD 
Covington & Burling 
 
         
PAUL L. JOSKOW 
Massachusetts Institute  
of Technology 
  RODNEY W. NICHOLS 
New York Academy  
of Sciences 
  ROGER G. NOLL 
Stanford University 
         
GILBERT S. OMENN 
University of Michigan 
  PETER PASSELL 
Milken Institute 
  RICHARD SCHMALENSEE 
Massachusetts Institute  
of Technology 
         
ROBERT N. STAVINS 
Harvard University  
  CASS R. SUNSTEIN 
University of Chicago 
  W. KIP VISCUSI 
Harvard University 
 
© 2001 AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies.  All rights reserved. 
All Joint Center publications can be found at www.aei.brookings.org  
 
1
                                                                                                                                               
The Regulation-Litigation Interaction 
W. Kip Viscusi 
   
The recent lawsuits involving cigarettes, guns, and other products have created a 
new phenomenon in which litigation either results in negotiated regulatory policies to 
settle the litigation or the litigation serves as a financial lever to promote support for 
governmental policies. The allocation of responsibilities for policy becomes blurred, as 
litigation increasingly becomes the mechanism for forcing regulatory changes. The 
policies that result from litigation almost invariably involve less public input and 
accountability than in the case of government regulation. The AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center held a conference on April 26—27, 2001 that explored the major lines of such 
litigation and examined the merits of these efforts and the potential problems they may 
create. 
  There are many policy contexts in which there is an interaction between the role 
of regulation and litigation. Many of the economic rationales for government regulation 
pertain to various forms of market failure, such as inadequate consumer information or 
failure to account for externalities to parties outside of a market transaction. These same 
forms of market failure often also lead to litigation as well, as injured parties seek to 
obtain damages for the harms that have been inflicted on them in contexts in which there 
was not appropriate recognition of their economic interests by the party inflicting the 
harm.
1 The policy task is to coordinate the influences of these two different sets of social 
institutions, recognizing their different strengths and different functions. In each case, 
however, it must be recognized that the ideal level of harm is not zero. A risk—free 
society is neither feasible nor desirable because of the inordinate costs of eliminating risk. 
  The potential importance of the interaction between regulation and litigation i s 
not a new issue. This overlap of institutional responsibilities and functions was a central 
theme of an American Law Institute study on tort liability published a decade ago.
2 
Traditionally, the focus has been on broad conceptual issues, such as the potential for 
institutional overlap with respect to the creation of economic incentives. The policy 
                                                 
1 In some instances plaintiffs may also seek damages even if negligence is not alleged. 
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concerns arising from these analyses of institutional functions often have focused on 
fairly narrow kinds of remedies, such as a regulatory compliance defense f or firms that 
are in compliance with explicit government standards but are nevertheless subject to 
litigation. 
  The different functioning of these social institutions is apparent from considering 
their roles in promoting health and safety. Consider first t he creation of economic 
incentives. Regulation is generally superior in addressing technical scientific issues 
because of the central role of specialized expertise in analyzing regulatory issues. 
Moreover, government regulation on behalf of society at large is especially appropriate 
when the policy decisions pertain to an entire product line rather than a specific product 
purchase by an individual. Assessment of design defects and hazard warnings, for 
example, should be on a product-wide basis. The issue of what any particular individual 
knew about the risks is not the key concern, but rather whether the firm provided 
adequate information within the market context for a representative product purchaser to 
make a knowledgeable risk-taking decision. 
Difficulties arise if these matters are delegated to juries on a case-by-case basis. 
Recent literature has documented the failings of juries in thinking sensibly about risk, as 
jurors exhibit a wide variety of systematic biases in assessing accident situations, such as 
hindsight bias in the evaluation of past risk actions. Government regulations will usually 
provide a more sound approach to promoting health than litigation, which by its very 
nature tends to focus on particular individual circumstances rather than the functioning of 
an entire product market. From a benefit—cost standpoint, the stringency of government 
regulations can be excessive in some cases due to the restrictive nature of regulatory 
agencies’ legislative mandates. Where this occurs, regulatory standards for health and 
safety typically should not require any additional augmentation through judicial 
proceedings. 
If, however, regulations do not exist for a particular product, litigation can often 
play a constructive role in addressing gaps in the regulatory structure and in stimulating 
regulatory activity. One of the most prominent examples in which litigation played such a 
role is with asbestos. Historically, asbestos risks had not been strongly regulated, but the 
emergence of a wave of asbestos litigation induced both the Occupational Safety and                                                                                                                        3        
 
 
Health Administration and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to set stringent 
regulation. In this instance, the combination of litigation and subsequent regulation led to 
inordinately large safety incentives. Litigation plays an additional role that complements 
regulation where it provides for a transfer of income to injured parties to address the 
damages incurred. 
A general problem with the existence of distinct roles for litigation and regulation 
is that there is no formal or informal mechanism for coordinating the roles of these two 
institutions. The fact that one institution is imposing economic penalties for a particular 
type of risk does not prevent the other from also imposing sanctions. The little 
coordination that does exist consists of the existence of regulatory compliance defenses, 
which typically are restricted fairly narrowly to punitive damages and are only pertinent 
in a few states. That there is a continuing inherent problem in coordinating the roles of 
regulation and litigation is well documented in the literature. 
What is new is that the character of these coordination problems has changed 
dramatically since the mid—1990s. The advent of litigation involving products such as 
tobacco, guns, and lead paint went well beyond the historical interactions of regulation 
and litigation that have been of concern in the literature. No longer was the issue one of 
litigation itself creating incentives that overlapped with those resulting from regulation. 
Rather, litigation was being used as the financial lever to force companies to accept 
negotiated regulatory policies. Thus, litigation itself led to regulation, but not regulation 
that went through the usual rulemaking process as a result of a careful analysis by 
government regulatory agencies subject to legislative mandates. Rather, the parties in the 
lawsuit negotiated regulatory changes as part of the package to end litigation. 
These negotiated solutions have also gone beyond simply specifying regulatory 
changes. In at least one instance, the settlement led to the imposition of what is 
effectively an excise tax on products. Rather than imposing a conventional damages 
award on the defendant, the tobacco settlement imposes charges on customers on a per 
unit basis in the future. Thus, the settlement establishes a tax on the product payable to 
the plaintiff and paid for almost entirely by the consumer rather than a damages payment 
paid for by the defendant. Litigation against health maintenance organizations (HMOs) 
proposes a similar tax—like structure. Thus, litigation has developed in a manner that not                                                                                                                        4        
 
 
only usurps the traditional governmental authority for government regulation, but also 
shifts the locus of establishing tax policy from the legislature to the parties involved in 
the litigation. Citizen interests are not explicitly represented and, as in the case of 
regulatory changes, there is no mechanism to ensure that these outcomes are in society’s 
best interests. Moreover, there is typically no procedure for creating even an appearance 
of the level of legitimacy accorded to governmental policies. 
If there is an error in the litigation settlements that impose regulatory and tax 
changes, the adverse consequences could be enormous. The stakes of the tobacco 
litigation exceeded $200 billion in expected penalties over the next 25 years. The 
regulatory changes also could have significant anti-competitive effects. While other 
litigation typically involves stakes that are not as great as those of tobacco the influences, 
in terms of the effects on particular industries, could be even greater. 
 
I. Optimal Deterrence 
The focus of this volume is on a series of case studies involving regulation 
through litigation. In the process, the chapters collectively shed light on the likely 
consequences of regulation through litigation for insurance markets and society at large. 
These effects will be discussed in more detail shortly. In considering the merits of 
litigation, it is useful to assess how it performs from the standpoint of efficient deterrence 
and efficient insurance. One of the chief functions of a liability system and government 
regulations is to establish optimal levels of deterrence. The case studies in this volume 
focus almost exclusively on health and safety risks, where the main economic issue is 
whether the incentives created lead to the appropriate levels of health and safety. The 
optimal level of risk is not zero, but is rather an efficient level of risk that reflects the 
appropriate balancing between the benefits and costs of risk reduction. 
  More specifically, risk reduction measures should be undertaken only to the 
extent that their benefits exceed the costs. For example, when judging whether a 
particular safety device should be added to a machine, doing so is desirable if the benefits 
of the safety device exceed the costs of modifying a product. It should be emphasized that 
these benefits include not only financial consequences but are based more broadly on 
society’s willingness to pay for the health reductions, recognizing the value of the risk                                                                                                                        5        
 
 
reduction that goes beyond the financial effects. Safety is optimized when the marginal 
benefits equal  marginal costs. Often there is a continuum of risk choices that can be 
made, such as the level of exposures to toxic chemicals. So long as the incremental 
benefits of increased safety exceed the incremental costs, then further tightening of the 
regulation or the imposition of liability on the firm is desirable. Regulation or litigation is 
excessively stringent, however, w hen firms are pushed to enact measures when 
incremental costs outweigh incremental benefits. 
  Considerations of optimal deterrence and the incentives created by social 
institutions is always a central economic concern. In regulatory contexts, the implications 
of policies for choices about the level of health and safety are rarely neutral. Ideally, 
litigation should also be concerned with creating incentives for efficient levels of safety, 
but this objective may be compromised when the main focus of the litigation is to provide 
compensation. 
  The discussion by Kenneth Abraham in Chapter 7 distinguishes two different 
types of litigation, each of which will have different implications for economic 
incentives. Litigation that he terms “forward looking” focuses o n setting up either 
requirements on firm behavior or a funding mechanism that will directly influence 
incentives for the future. The settlement of the tobacco litigation was forward looking in 
character in that it led to regulatory changes as well as a damages formula that was 
largely tantamount to an excise tax on cigarettes. Similarly, the litigation involving guns, 
which is reviewed in the chapter by Phillip Cook and Jens Ludwig, is forward looking to 
the extent that it seeks to impose safety requirements on the design of handguns as well 
as restrictions on the distribution of handguns. Although the litigation against HMOs, 
discussed in Chapter 6, is less well developed than that for cigarettes and guns, the 
overall model that is being adopted closely follows that for tobacco and is forward 
looking in character. 
  Litigation that Abraham terms “backward looking” is more similar in character to 
conventional tort litigation. The lawsuits by women suffering problems they attribute to 
breast implants and the lead paint litigation against landlords both fall into the backward 
looking category. These suits seek to obtain compensation for parties that have been 
injured. The provision of such compensation will establish payment structures that could                                                                                                                        6        
 
 
potentially alter future incentives because firms will expect to be subject to similar 
sanctions from future litigation. However, if all such decisions have already been made or 
if the product is no longer sold, there will be no incentive effect unless these suits 
impinge on current behavior in some manner. Thus, in the case of the lead paint 
litigation, there will be no incentive effect for lead paint manufacturers because lead paint 
is no longer produced in the United States. However, the lead paint suits against landlords 
potentially could have an incentive effect to the extent that they affect building 
maintenance, efforts to remove lead paint, and warnings to tenants about lead paint risks. 
Also, there may be more general deterrent effects for landlords beyond lead paint.  
 
II. Optimal Insurance 
  A second potential function of social institutions dealing with risk is providing 
optimal insurance to those who have suffered injuries or illnesses. Regulatory policies by 
the federal government generally do not provide any insurance compensation for victims 
but instead are focused almost exclusively on establishing regulatory standards for health 
and safety. Insurance functions are typically handled through targeted government 
programs that focus on the disabled, the poor, or the elderly. 
  In contrast, litigation often has as its principal purpose an effort to transfer income 
to those who have suffered injuries. From the standpoint of optimal insurance this 
transfer should be sufficient to completely cover the economic loss in instances in which 
people have suffered a financial loss. The desirability of providing this insurance stems 
from the role of individual risk aversion, which makes insurance of such losses desirable. 
In the case of governmental entities that have suffered economic losses, such as the 
medical costs attributable to tobacco that were incurred by the states, this type of 
insurance rationale would not be pertinent. Governmental entities should be risk-neutral 
except with respect to extremely large losses because they can spread these losses across 
a large citizenry base. Thus, any optimal insurance rationale for transfers to the 
government must assume that the losses ultimately borne by individual taxpayers will be 
sufficiently great that risk aversion will come into play. 
  In the case of injuries and illnesses to individuals, there will be both financial 
losses as well as effects on individual health. Whereas the object of insurance for                                                                                                                        7        
 
 
financial losses is to restore individuals to their pre—accident level of utility, that 
objective is not pertinent in the case of health effects. Optimal insurance satisfies the 
property that it equates the marginal utility of income when one is healthy to the marginal 
utility of income when one is ill. Typically, it will not be desirable to purchase so much 
insurance so as to be as well off as he or she would have been had the illness or injury not 
occurred because these events reduce people’s ability to derive welfare benefits from 
additional funds. Even enormous transfers of money to one after becoming disabled may 
not be adequate to restore the pre-accident welfare level. There is also the practical 
problem of ascertaining what a person’s psychic losses are from such major injuries. 
Thus, in the case of the breast implant litigation, there will be an insurance objective but 
the proper role of the courts will typically fall short of restoring the plaintiff’s pre—
illness level of utility even in situations in which liability for the firm is established. 
 
III. The Case Studies 
  This volume will present a series of case studies of different types of litigation as 
well as broader analyses of the role of mass torts and class actions and their implications 
for economic performance. Table 1 summarizes each of these areas of litigation. In each 
case, there is some alleged shortcoming from the standpoint of efficient behavior on the 
part of the firm as well as an alleged or actual failure on the part of government agencies. 
The third column of Table 1 indicates the particular remedy that is either sought by the 
litigation or has resulted from the litigation. These remedies go beyond conventional 
damages payments and include measures of a regulatory character as well as financial 
penalties that will affect the product cost. A summary of the efficiency effects of the 
different product litigation appears in the last column of Table 1. 
 
IV. Tobacco 
  By far the most noteworthy example of regulation through litigation is that of the 
litigation against the tobacco industry. The most salient example of this litigation consists 
of the suits by the state governments that sought to recover Medicaid expenses that they 
attributed to cigarettes. The prospective suit that has been filed by the federal government 
also has a similar character. These parallels no doubt led the Federal government to                                                                                                                        8        
 
 
initiate the suit and presumably also led the Bush administration to suggest that an out—
of—court settlement should be the appropriate solution. 
  The alleged market failure that gave rise to these suits is that there is a medical 
cost externality that has not been fully addressed. Why governmental entities such as the 
states and the federal government failed to tax cigarettes adequately to reflect this cost of 
cigarettes is a major unanswered question. Critics allege that the lobbying power of the 
tobacco industry has hindered taxes from being set at appropriate levels. The risks of 
smoking have been well known for decades and, indeed, have been subject to annual 
reports by the U.S. Surgeon General as well as government-mandated warnings. Given 
the knowledge that cigarettes do in fact increase health costs, what was the governmental 
failure that prevented legislatures from enacting taxes to cover these costs? The 
fundamental question raised by these suits from an institutional standpoint is why there 
was any need to resort to litigation rather than having traditional governmental processes 
address these costs. 
  W. Kip Viscusi’s assessment of tobacco in Chapter 2 makes two general points 
with respect to this litigation. First, from the standpoint of economic cost externalities 
arising from cigarettes, there is no net cost imposed on the states or on the federal 
government, even if one excludes the role of excise taxes. Proper recognition of the full 
health consequences of smoking indicates that smokers will live shorter lives than 
nonsmokers and consequently will generate fewer nursing home expenses as well as 
lower pension and social security costs than nonsmokers. Indeed, smokers are self-
financing for every state and for the federal government, even excluding the role of 
excise taxes already in place. Thus, there are no net economic damages to governments 
arising from cigarettes. The second major point made in the Viscusi paper is that there is 
no evident harm caused by the  alleged wrongful conduct by the industry. Survey 
evidence indicates that smokers are in fact aware of the risks posed by cigarettes and 
have an exaggerated perception of the risk. Thus, in terms of misinformed decisions, 
there is no evidence that alleged wrongful conduct by the cigarette industry led people to 
smoke cigarettes. Indeed, the risks of smoking have been well known and highly 
publicized for decades and are perhaps the most highly publicized risks in society.                                                                                                                        9        
 
 
  Chapter 9 by Richard Epstein takes a somewhat different approach to the tobacco 
litigation. He does not question whether cigarettes are self-financing or whether people 
overestimate the risks of smoking. No suits by the states or the federal government have 
any justification in Epstein’s view unless there would be an appropriate basis for 
litigation on the part of the individuals who decided to smoke. He believes such litigation 
is without foundation because hazard warnings have been present on cigarette packages 
for decades. Moreover, the warnings since 1969 include provisions that preempt litigation 
against the industry based on inadequate warnings. 
  The remedy that was sought in the case of the tobacco litigation involved the 
transfer of money to the states. As indicated by Viscusi as well as John Calfee and Gary 
Schwartz, this monetary transfer did not take the form of a traditional damages payment 
but rather consisted largely of a penalty on future cigarettes that was tantamount to an 
excise tax. This “tax” was unusual, however, in that it was not assessed by any 
legislature, but instead emerged through litigation and ultimately from bargains between 
the state attorneys general and cigarette industry executives. These parties also negotiated 
a variety of regulatory changes, including restrictions on advertising that some view as 
having anticompetitive consequences. The cigarette litigation was also noteworthy in that 
it generated enormous levels of compensation for plaintiffs’ attorneys that ran into the 
billions of dollars paid by particular states and hundreds of millions of dollars in 
compensation received by plaintiffs’ attorneys. These attorney fee arrangements were 
controversial not only because of their size, but also because state attorneys general 
negotiated these arrangements without any open bidding process or public scrutiny. In the 
case of Massachusetts, the attorney general negotiated an arrangement that even the 
governor of the state regarded as excessive. 
  In terms of the optimal deterrence and optimal insurance objectives outlined 
above, the cigarette litigation provided for no insurance of individual losses but only a 
transfer to states. Moreover, states should be regarded as risk-neutral so that insurance 
does not really come into play. The incentives created on future cigarette sales involve a 
per pack tax that will discourage smoking generally. Whether doing so is desirable 
depends on one’s assessment of the net economic consequences to society. At least from 
the standpoint of the financial effects, the results presented by  Viscusi indicate that                                                                                                                        10        
 
 
additional taxation is not warranted. Thus, from the standpoint of the issues involved in 
the state cases, there is no efficiency—based rationale for the tax. The tax also is not 
structured in a manner to provide meaningful incentives. A key drawback of the tax—like 
structure of the damages is that the level of the tax does not vary with the riskiness of the 
cigarette product in any way. If companies were to develop risk-free cigarettes in the 
future, then these products would be subject to the same tax even though they would 
entail no medical costs. Ideally, any tax system should provide incentives for safety 
innovation. 
The shortcoming of the tax structure of the damages payment in tobacco 
ultimately can be traced to the fact that this arrangement did not emerge from a careful 
analysis of what the tax structure should be. Rather, it was simply a financial settlement 
of litigation that happened to take the form of a tax. 
 
V. Guns 
  The high stakes payoff of the cigarette litigation has n ot been lost on attorneys 
considering litigation in other areas. The next prominent example of the regulation 
through litigation phenomenon is the subject of Chapter 3 by Phillip Cook and Jens 
Ludwig. In the New Orleans guns suit, the plaintiffs allege that the companies neglected 
to provide adequate safety features for guns. The Chicago lawsuit has a different focus: a 
claim that firms created a public nuisance by not preventing illegal sales of firearms. 
  The financial resources of the gun industry are dwarfed by that of the tobacco 
industry. As a result, the stakes are considerably less in terms of the overall effect on the 
economy. This difference in the financial magnitudes involved lead Cook and Ludwig to 
conclude that the object of the gun litigation  is primarily to lead to regulatory changes 
rather than to provide financial compensation. However, this difference may simply be a 
reflection of the more modest size of the gun industry. If it were not for the threatened 
financial sanctions, it is unlikely that the cities would have the leverage to force the 
regulatory changes that they are seeking through the litigation. Because this litigation is 
not as far along as the tobacco litigation, the ultimate emphasis on financial transfers as 
opposed to regulatory changes is not yet apparent. What the plaintiffs are seeking is a set 
of negotiated changes with respect to gun distribution and safety mechanisms for guns.                                                                                                                        11        
 
 
As Cook and Ludwig have observed, some firms have already exited the industry and 
others have changed ownership so that the financial consequences are significant for 
individual firms even if their aggregate impact on the overall economy is relatively small. 
  Cook and Ludwig assess the societal consequences of firearms by establishing a 
statistical relationship between the presence of guns to homicides. Their result: that there 
is an additional death associated with the presence of an extra 15,000 guns. As the 
commentary in this volume by Richard Epstein observes, however, this simple analysis is 
controversial for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the fact that it does not 
distinguish whether the guns actually were involved in the homicides. For example, 
people in high crime areas may choose to purchase guns for self defense, but that does 
not imply that their guns led to homicides, which may have been committed with 
weapons other than guns. Epstein also notes that the fundamental difference between 
guns and other harmful products is that guns may have a legitimate use. The social 
objective should be to prevent guns from being used unlawfully, not to prevent gun use 
overall. This focused objective, in Epstein’s view, creates a policy problem of a more 
targeted nature than simply eliminating guns altogether. 
  Based on their assessment that guns impose net economic costs, which is shared 
by many other economists, Cook and Ludwig explore various policy remedies that have 
been proposed. These proposals include personalized technologies for guns as well as 
various kinds of safety mechanisms. Many of these options appear to offer considerable 
potential. The question then becomes: what market failure has prevented companies from 
introducing these products? One gun industry view is that the personalized gun 
technology and other such proposals are not as sound or as well developed as advocates 
such as Cook and Ludwig suggest.
3 
  Although Cook and Ludwig do not explore the sources of market failure in detail, 
they do address the possible role of governmental failure in establishing regulations that 
would have promoted such outcomes. They suggest that because of the diffuse public 
benefits from gun regulation, strong interest groups supporting gun use have been able to 
thwart the enactment of socially beneficial legislation. The result is a series of lawsuits by 
cities that did not need legislative approval but would nevertheless generate leverage to 
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produce regulatory changes. As with the regulatory policies that emerged from the 
tobacco litigation, these regulatory proposals do not go through the kind of detailed 
review and rulemaking process that is the normal course for governmental regulations.  
 
VI. Lead Paint 
  Some of the lawyers who are veterans of the tobacco litigation have become 
engaged in various lawsuits involving lead paint. These lawsuits bear some similarities to 
the tobacco and gun litigation because they often involve government entities suing 
firms. However, the character of the litigation is distinctive in other respects. 
  Chapter 4 by Randall Lutter and Elizabeth Mader distinguishes two different 
kinds of lead paint lawsuits. The first type of lawsuit consists of suits against the lead 
paint manufacturers. These suits closely parallel the tobacco lawsuits. The second class of 
lawsuits consists of landlord-tenant suits. This litigation is more akin to standard personal 
injury litigation. 
  Consider first the suits against lead paint manufacturers. The fact that these suits 
are even being lodged at all is somewhat curious given that there has been a national ban 
on the use of lead paint enforced by the Consumer Product Safety Commission since 
1978. Moreover, recently issued EPA standards for the presence of lead paint, which 
have been incorporated in rules promulgated by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development impose standards on lead paint exposures. There are also required housing 
disclosures of the presence of lead paint to buyers and renters as well as state and local 
regulations pertaining to lead levels. Lead paint production has not been active for 23 
years, and exposures to historical applications of lead paint are now strongly regulated. 
The lead paint lawsuits in which the defendants are the lead paint producing companies 
consequently parallel the tobacco and gun litigation because they focus on historical 
behavior. Moreover, as in the case of tobacco, there is often a latency period before the 
harm is done, so that the damages if paid may not always go to the particular individuals 
who suffered health losses but could go to other entities, such as local governments. 
Unlike the tobacco cases, however, there will be no excise tax financing mechanism that 
might influence future production of lead paint because this production has already 
ceased. Consequently, from the standpoint of optimal deterrence of lead paint                                                                                                                        13        
 
 
manufacturers, the lawsuits consequently will have no influence. To the extent that this 
litigation has any incentive effect it will be by generating an expectation among firms 
making other products that the legal system might eventually impose costs on them after 
they have ceased producing or selling these items. 
  The historical claims against lead paint manufacturers have also created 
difficulties in terms of assignment of liability. In any particular context, it is likely that 
there have been several applications of paint to a wall over time, and it is often 
impossible to ascertain the date of the paint application or the manufacturer of the lead 
paint. Some lawsuits have sought unsuccessfully to apply market share liability rules to 
assign responsibility for the historical applications of lead paint. These efforts have not 
been successful, in part because of the inherent uncertainties regarding when the lead 
paint was applied and the respective market shares of different companies at different 
points in time. Efforts to apply similar concepts of market share liability to guns have 
also not been successful. 
  The second set of lead paint lawsuits involving landlords and tenants could 
potentially function quite differently from the standpoint of both optimal deterrence and 
efficient insurance. Landlords continue to make decisions regarding building 
maintenance, which in turn affects exposure to lead. Moreover, to the extent that these 
lawsuits lead to compensation of people actually exposed to lead, there is potentially 
some insurance rationale for the litigation. As Lutter and Mader indicate, however, there 
are also strong government regulations already in place that address many of these 
exposure issues, thus reducing the deterrence rationale. 
  The pattern of lead paint litigation also yields some surprising results. 
Increasingly, these lawsuits lead to out of court settlements, but Lutter and Mader 
observe that notwithstanding the decline of lead levels in contaminated housing, the 
number of lawsuits has not diminished. Their statistical analysis suggests that higher 
blood—lead levels do not increase the probability that a plaintiff will win the case, but do 
increase the magnitude of the award. Lutter and Mader, as well as the commentary in this 
volume by Thomas Kniesner, conclude that litigation is a very poor mechanism for 
promoting control of lead and promoting individual health, which they believe can be 




VII. Breast Implants 
  The role of government regulations also figures prominently in Joni Hersch’s 
analysis of breast implants. The conventional view in the literature, which is shared by 
the commentary in this volume by Peter Schuck, is that the breast implant litigation 
epitomizes the e xtent to which class action litigation has led to undesirable social 
outcomes. According to this view, companies were punished and in one case driven into 
bankruptcy (Dow Corning) by claims of illnesses that were not supported by the 
scientific evidence. The chapter by Hersch challenges this conventional assessment by 
tracking the state of information at different points in time and the link of this 
information to the role of litigation. 
  Many observers suggest that the breast implant litigation should be a non-issue for 
the courts because of the role of regulation by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
The commentary in the chapter by Epstein, for example, proposes that there should be an 
exemption for all products regulated by the FDA because this regulation already 
establishes appropriate tests of product safety. While that point of view is certainly 
pertinent to prescription drugs and many medical devices, Hersch shows that breast 
implants were in use before there was FDA medical device regulation. Even after the 
authority of the agency was extended to include medical devices, the FDA never 
explicitly reviewed breast implants and evaluated their properties in terms of the safety 
and efficacy of the devices. Thus, unlike more recently regulated products, the fact that 
breast implants ultimately fell under the jurisdiction of the FDA in no way ensures that 
there was another governmental entity that made the judgment that the product met 
adequate safety standards. 
  The litigation that resulted began with l awsuits involving adverse health 
consequences of breast implants other than life-threatening ailments. This litigation was 
based on well established medical consequences of breast implants such as capsular 
contracture around the implants, and led companies to provide hazard warnings to alert 
potential users of breast implants to these consequences. A more controversial and more 
recent line of litigation involving breast implants has involved individual suits and class 
actions regarding highly speculative ailments, such as connective tissue disease and                                                                                                                        15        
 
 
autoimmune diseases, such as lupus and scleroderma. Plaintiffs often waged successful 
legal battles based on the fact that they suffered identifiable ailments and that case reports 
often linked the presence of  breast implants to such ailments. What was missing, 
however, were detailed epidemiological studies demonstrating that breast implants 
increased the risk of severe adverse effects and made it more probable than not that breast 
implants were the cause of their ailments. Many critics of the breast implant litigation 
consequently claimed that these cases had no merit because the risks had not been 
documented based on large scale epidemiological studies performed for this product. 
  Hersch challenges this view based on the nature of the information flows. 
Because government regulators never required companies to undertake this research and 
companies never did so on their own, she views it as being inappropriate to fault the 
litigation based on informational shortcomings. The availability of epidemiological data 
is controlled by the companies. Moreover, when the first such studies did emerge the 
samples were sufficiently small that one could still not rule out with any reasonable 
degree of confidence the hypothesis that the use of breast implants made it more probable 
than not that the patient’s ailments were attributable to this product. After substantial 
additional research the courts have now concluded that there is no legitimate scientific 
basis for the claims for ailments such as connective tissue disorders. 
  The breast implant litigation was very much in the spirit of traditional personal 
injury litigation in that the beneficiaries of the damage awards consisted of injured 
individuals. However, because of the class action character of much of the litigation, the 
scale of it resembled that of the suits by governmental entities against tobacco, guns, and 
lead paint. 
  While the breast implant litigation itself did not lead to negotiated settlements that 
imposed regulation, it did serve to stimulate regulatory action by the FDA. The litigation 
led to the production of company documents that alerted the FDA to problems 
concerning the product, including leakage of the silicone gel from the implants and 
concealment of these problems by the company. Moreover, it may not be entirely 
coincidental that FDA Commissioner David Kessler suspended the use of breast implants 
shortly after a major court award in a breast implant case. Kessler’s decision is widely 
viewed as one of overreaction to the scientific evidence and public pressures.                                                                                                                        16        
 
 
  The upshot of the breast implantation litigation is that the scientific consensus is 
that the product does not pose long term risks. Hersch documents that breast implants 
remain a widely popular form of cosmetic surgery. However, the financial cost to the 
firms that produced the implants cannot be reversed. Moreover, the bottom line from the 
standpoint of efficiency is that, at least in retrospect, society is not better off. The current 
state of information indicates that there was not a significant shortfall in safety on the 
dimensions alleged in the most costly breast implant cases. 
 
VIII. HMOs 
  The same kinds of lawsuits that have been lodged against products such as 
tobacco and lead paint have  also focused on health maintenance organizations. This 
development may appear to be curious from a risk standpoint. Tobacco is certainly a 
risky product. Guns are often risky, particularly if they are misused. Similarly, lead paint 
and breast implants pose hazards. However, one would have expected that the main effect 
of HMOs would be to enhance health rather than to increase risk. 
  The focus of the most recent litigation is on the quality control problems of 
managed care facilities. The plaintiff group is known as the REPAIR team, which is an 
organization headed by a former prominent tobacco attorney, Richard “Dickie” Scruggs. 
What Scruggs and his colleagues are attempting to do is to impose a settlement patterned 
after that in tobacco. Perhaps in an effort to force a settlement, they claim their HMO 
litigation will threaten the entire HMO industry with bankruptcy. Thus, as in the case of 
many of the other litigation case studies in this volume, considerable financial pressures 
are being brought to bear in the hopes of generating some kind of settlement: principally, 
a tax on premiums paid by individuals purchasing managed care insurance. In the case of 
tobacco, one could easily make the argument that the excise tax discourages consumption 
of a risky product. However, for HMOs the effect of any kind of premium tax will be to 
discourage utilization of health care, which is presumably harmful to individual health 
rather than beneficial. Thus, extensions of the tobacco model appear to be particularly 
inappropriate in this case. 
  Chapter 6 by Daniel Kessler and Mark McClellan use survey data pertaining to 
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use of litigation with respect to HMOs. Their empirical analysis suggests that there 
appear to be few demonstrable benefits of litigation. In fact, increased medical 
malpractice claims lead to defensive medicine and the use of low benefit treatments 
designed to decrease the risk of litigation rather than to foster patient health. In contrast, 
the increased role of managed care has led to more efficient health care utilization 
outcomes. Moreover, as was noted above, the character of the financial incentives created 
in at least one line of litigation is not structured to promote better quality care in any 
sense, but will simply reduce the quantity of medical care received by raising premiums. 
  The concept of treating HMOs as a dangerous product that should be discouraged, 
in much the same way as society discourages the use of tobacco and handguns, appears to 
be without any sound foundation and driven solely by the desire of attorneys to use the 
regulation through litigation concept to their own personal gain. As of yet, there has been 
no settlement of this litigation and there is no indication that it will lead to any broadly 
based regulatory changes other than the proposed tax on insurance premiums. 
 
IX. Insurance Market Ramifications 
  Large scale lawsuits involving damages payments in the billions of dollars have 
profound ramifications for the defendant companies, but they also have influences that 
extend to insurers as well. In some instances, firms have purchased insurance to cover at 
least a portion of their losses. As Kenneth Abraham and the commentary on his chapter 
by J. David Cummins indicate, assigning responsibility for bearing the financial costs is 
often a highly complex matter. Many of the risk exposures that have been subject to 
litigation are subject to long latency periods. Although asbestos risks are perhaps the 
most noteworthy case, tobacco, breast implants, and lead paint also have effects that are 
not immediate. The levels and timing of the risk exposure from such cases create 
considerable problems from the standpoint of insurance. Assigning responsibility for any 
given ailment is difficult, particularly in situations in which there are multiple potential 
causes. The role of time also is important as well. Did the disease result from a risk 
exposure that took place during the period of time when the insurance company w as 
writing coverage for such losses, or was it some other time period? In many instances, the 
character of the risks was not known at the time insurance companies wrote the policies.                                                                                                                        18        
 
 
As a result, the insurance premiums charged were inadequate to cover the  losses that 
eventually emerged once new diseases were identified or new lines of litigation 
developed. Now that insurance companies are aware of such unanticipated costs, 
Abraham notes that they are beginning to raise premiums to cover such contingencies, 
thus boosting the cost of insurance to potential purchasers. 
  The character of the insurance policies that the companies are willing to write has 
also changed. Abraham explores the evolution of insurance contracts in the case of 
pollution coverage and, more generally, coverage for toxic torts. For example, did the 
damage done by breast implants occur “during the policy period” because that was the 
time at which the patient received the breast implants? Or did the harm occur at some 
later date? Such latent injuries often trigger substantial debates as to whether the injury 
occurred during this policy period and what the character of exposure should be to trigger 
coverage. As a result of this kind of litigation, insurance contracts now typically are 
written to provide “claims made” coverage for a particular policy period, thus reducing 
the uncertainties faced by insurance companies. However, even with a narrowing of the 
coverage of insurance contracts that are being written, Abraham concludes that firms are 
charging an uncertainty tax on premiums because of the difficulty in pricing risks that 
have a potentially long tail. 
 
X. Class Actions and Mass Torts 
  While many of the studies identify problems that have arisen with respect to the 
large scale litigation case studies that were analyzed, Chapter 8 by Rosenberg suggests 
that this litigation in some instances can serve a constructive function. In particular, he 
claims that mass torts are far superior to a rash of individual cases in addressing cases 
that involve common questions of law, common questions of fact, common legal facts, 
and situations in which there are potential economies of scale. The role of such litigation 
is to avoid the duplication of individual lawsuits. In addition, Rosenberg makes the novel 
observation that the launching of mass tort suits leads to optimal investment in the 
litigation by plaintiffs because it avoids the collective action problems that would 
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  In many respects, one can view the Rosenberg model as one in which the judicial 
system in effect is the counterpart to regulatory agencies. In much the same way as 
government regulators find it efficient to establish broadly based regulatory standards for 
particular products, Rosenberg finds it more efficient for the l egal system to address 
product-related concerns in a single suit rather than in a series of individual cases. This 
would enable the legal system to take more of a market based perspective. The focus of 
Rosenberg’s chapter however, is on the superiority of mass torts to individual suits, rather 
than on the superiority of mass torts to government regulation. 
  One noteworthy aspect of mass torts is the all or nothing character of the potential 
payoffs. If firms are risk-neutral, then they will be indifferent t o facing a series of 
individual lawsuits or one large scale lawsuit. An important caveat is that this conclusion 
assumes away the potential for learning and changing one’s litigation strategy in a series 
of cases. Moreover, once the stakes are in the billions, risk aversion of shareholders 
enters as a factor. By raising the stakes of litigation in a manner that threatens firms with 
bankruptcy should they lose, class actions increase firms’ willingness to settle such cases 
rather than put the viability of the firm at risk, especially where there is a fear of punitive 
damages. Thus, the merits of class action may vary substantially in different situations 
depending on whether we are more in Rosenberg’s constructive world of ideal class 
action assumptions or the world of Judge Richard Posner, who views these lawsuits as no 
more than single class blackmail. 
  The analytical desirability of the Rosenberg class action model also hinges quite 
critically on the assumptions that he specifies pertaining to the character of the class 
action. As he emphasizes, homogeneity of the cases is of particular importance, and one 
can view his criteria for the constructive role of mass torts as a useful checklist for what 
conditions must be satisfied for these lawsuits to be superior to individual litigation. 
 
XI. Policy Prognosis 
  Although several contributors to this volume cite constructive roles for class 
actions and the regulation through litigation phenomenon, many have identified potential 
problems as well. Moreover, many of these chapters have identified criteria for judging 
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like to discourage litigation that has undesirable consequences, such as usurping the 
traditional authority of government regulation agencies and the control of taxation by the 
legislature. 
  How constructive changes could be accomplished is more problematic. The 
difficulty is not one of faulty government policy. The usual calls for government reform 
will not be effective. However, the more that can be done to promote effective regulatory 
oversight of potentially risky products, such as breast implants, and the greater the ability 
of government entities to ensure appropriate quality levels for products, such as the health 
care provided by HMOs, the less chance there will be of successful litigation to address 
these concerns. In many instances, the litigation stems from a real or perceived failure on 
the part of regulators to address potential harms to society. 
  Directly discouraging litigation is a more difficult matter. The attorneys bringing 
these suits have no reason to discipline themselves and restrain from launching lawsuits 
that are in their financial interest but perhaps not society’s. The stakes involve payoffs to 
them in the billions of dollars, which constitutes a considerable lure for even the most 
self—restrained. Changing the character of the reimbursement of attorneys to avoid the 
windfall gains that resulted in the tobacco litigation and are being sought in the lead paint 
and HMO litigation could do much to deter such lawsuits in the future. At the very 
minimum, there should be increased public scrutiny of such fee arrangements and a 
competitive open bidding process for all such deals involving government entities as the 
plaintiffs. The goals would be to discourage sweetheart deals with attorneys and litigation 
that is driven by the prospect of windfall private gains resulting from the threat of 
catastrophic losses by governmental lawsuits. 
  Whether the regulation through litigation phenomenon proves to be a temporary 
or permanent way to address risk issues will depend to a great degree on the extent to 
which the concept can be applied to other products. Alcoholic beverages, fast food, 
automobiles, sport utility vehicles, and other products that create risks to consumers and 
external risks to others are among the potential targets of litigation. Whether such 
litigation will ever materialize hinges largely on how the courts address such suits. 
Unfortunately, because the tobacco litigation was settled, we lost an opportunity for the 
courts to establish definitive legal guidelines for such litigation. Only time will tell                                                                                                                        21        
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Summary of Justifications for Litigation in Case Studies 
 
Product  Alleged Governmental Failure  Remedy  Efficiency Effects 
Tobacco  Medical cost externality to state 
Medicaid programs not addressed. 
Lawsuits to transfer money to states; 
led to excise tax equivalent and 
negotiated regulatory changes; 
billions in plaintiff attorney fees. 
Adverse effects based on assessment 
of the financial costs of smoking. 
       
Guns  Governmental failure because of 
diffuse public benefits and strong 
interest group pressure. 
Lawsuits by cities threatening 
penalties, with prospect of 
regulatory changes. 
Prospective effects on gun distribution 
and safety devices, but experts 
disagree on desirability of all such 
measures. 
       
Lead paint  Vigorous existing federal 
regulations, with lead paint ban 
since 1978; landlords subject to state 
and local regulations, but issues of 
efficacy and victim compensation. 
Lawsuits against paint companies 
seeking payment for historical acts; 
landlord lawsuits for current 
exposures seeking compensation. 
Incentives for landlords to reduce 
exposures, fixed costs for producers. 
       
Breast implants  In use before FDA medical device 
regulation and not regulated when 
authority extended; little company 
research, but company suppression 
of adverse information. 
Lawsuits seeking compensation for 
morbidity effects and speculative 
ailments; led to FDA review and 
research, often exonerating the 
product. 
Exit from market of breast implant 
producers, perhaps may stimulate 
more research on such medical 
devices. 
       
HMOs  Quality control problems of 
managed care not adequately 
regulated. 
Litigation to force tobacco-type 
solution of premium taxes to pay off 
plaintiff attorneys. 
Negative effect in discouraging 
purchase of coverage. 